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OXMAN V. WLS-TV: TER-R.I.F.-Ic NEWS FOR ADEA PLAINTIFFS
Oxman v. WLS-TV 846 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1988)
In Oxman v. WLS - TV I the Seventh Circuit modified the elements of
a prima facie case of employment discrimination applicable to reduction-
in-force (R.I.F.) situations under the federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA).2 As a result, plaintiffs no longer must show evi-
dence of their employer's discriminatory intent3 to establish a prima
facie4 case of employment discrimination.
Jonah Oxman, sixty-one, was an employee of WLS-TV, managing its
satellite bureau. To cut expenses, WLS-TV closed the satellite bureau
and discharged Oxman.' Although Oxman was a qualified candidate,
management failed to offer him another available position and subse-
quently filled several positions with younger employees.' Oxman
charged WLS-TV with age discrimination under the ADEA.7 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to WLS-TV, finding lack of dis-
1. 846 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1988).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. In Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1985), the employer discharged
fifty-four year old Matthews along with thirteen other employees for economic reasons. Id. at 1216.
Matthews offered termination statistics of employees over age forty versus employees under forty as
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1218. The Seventh Circuit found the statis-
tics insignificant and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1219. The
Matthews court held a plaintiff discharged due to an R.I.F. must produce circumstantial or direct
evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent in order to establish a prima facie age discrimina-
tion case. Id. at 1218. In Oxman, the Seventh Circuit overruled Matthews. 846 F.2d at 456.
4. "Prima facie" means a legally rebuttable presumption. 9 WlGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494
(Chadbourn rev. 1981).
5. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448,451 (7th Cir. 1988). Oxman worked for WLS-TV for 17
years in various newswriting and managerial positions. During that time, management never com-
plained about his performance and rewarded Oxman with annual salary increases. Oxman held the
position of "northwest bureau" manager at the time of his discharge. Id. at 450.
6. Id. at 451. According to Oxman, the WLS-TV news director told him at his discharge
"that the news bureau had grown very complex and that if Oxman took a job as a producer, within a
week the station would discover that Oxman could not do the job." Id. At the time of discharge,
WLS-TV had two newswriter positions and created a manager of scheduling position. WLS-TV did
not consider Oxman for either position. Id. Management filled one newswriter's position with a 31
year old editor. The manager of scheduling position was filled with a 26 year old. Id.
7. Id. Oxman claimed WLS-TV violated ADEA § 623(a) by not considering him for available
positions for which he qualified. Section 623(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an
individual because of his age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Oxman's claim falls under the disparate treatment theory of employment discrimination as op-
posed to disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment theory, the employer treats some employ-
ees less favorably than others because of race, sex, religion, national origin or age. The disparate
impact theory involves facially neutral employment practices that in fact fall more harshly on one
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criminatory intent.8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and held: to establish an ADEA prima facie case an employee
discharged because of work force reduction is not required to prove the
employer intended to discriminate. To establish such a prima facie case
an employee must show that at the time of his discharge: 1) he was
"within the protected age group"; 2) he was "performing according to
his employer's legitimate expectations"; 3) "he was terminated"; and
4) "others not in the protected class were treated more favorably." 9
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) t° to combat employment discrimination11 against workers aged
forty and over.12 Because of the similarity in aims and provisions, courts
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. See generally B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-12 (1976).
8. Oxman v. WLS-TV (Oxman III), 641 F. Supp. 652, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The district court
initally denied defendant's motion for summary judgment in Oxman v. WLS-TV (Oxman I1), 609 F.
Supp. 1384, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1985), but granted the defendant's renewed motion in Oxman III par-
tially because of the Seventh Circuit's interim decision in Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers. See supra note
3 and accompanying text.
9. 846 F.2d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 1988). The Oxman prima facie elements are very similar to
those established in Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1985). See supra note 3.
They differ in two respects. The Oxman court changed Matthews' second element of the plaintiff~s
capacity from "was qualified to assume another position," Matthews, 769 F.2d at 1217, to "was
performing according to the employer's legitimate expectations." 846 F.2d 448, 455. Second, the
Oxman court changed Matthews' fourth element from "circumstantial or direct evidence from which
a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in making the
employment decision," Matthews, 769 F.2d at 1217, to "the employer treated others not in the pro-
tected class more favorably." Id. at 455. Matthews adopted the prima facie elements developed in
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
See infra notes 32-34 and accomanying text.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11. Congress' statement of findings provides in part that the disadvantages faced by older work-
ers in efforts to retain and regain employment, employers' setting of arbitrary age limits, and the
high incidence of unemployment among older workers prompted its passage of the ADEA. The
Act's purpose is to promote employment based on ability rather than age and to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment. 29 U.S.C. § 621. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1967 speech calling on Congress to remedy the "serious and sense-
less loss [of the older worker] to a nation on the move", 1 PUB. PAPERS 32, 37 (1968), and a Labor
Department study prompted Congress' passage of the ADEA. The Labor Department study esti-
mated that persons over 45 comprised 27% of all unemployed and 40% of the long-term unem-
ployed. W. WILLARD WIRTZ, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION 715 Of THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE Dis-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 6 (June 1965).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). ADEA prohibits failing or refusing to hire, discharging or
otherwise discriminating against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment due to age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section
623(f)(l)-(3) provides exceptions to these provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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often apply Title VI11 burden of proof standards to ADEA cases.14
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,15 a Title VII case, established the
indirect "burden shifting" method of proof.1 6 To establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination, an employee must show: 1) he be-
longed to the protected class;1" 2) he applied and was qualified for the
job;'" 3) despite his qualifications, the employer rejected him;19 4) "after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of the complainant's qualifications.", 20
Once the employee establishes his prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
13. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.
Congress modeled the ADEA's prohibitions after Title VII, while following the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 for remedies. Scholl & Strang, Age Discrimination and the Modern Reduction in
Force, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 331, 336 (1986). See also Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621, 623
n.10 (1983) (comparing sections of Title VII and ADEA that proscribe employer's practices).
14. See, eg., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (McDonnell Douglas Title VII
burden of proof standard applied to ADEA replacement case); Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light
Co, 585 F.2d 918, 919 n.1 (8th Cir. 1978) (McDonnell Douglas formula applied to ADEA layoff
case); Kentroti v. Frontier Air Lines, 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978) (McDonnell Douglas
formula applied to ADEA denial of seniority number case); Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1978) (McDonnell Douglas formula applied to ADEA discharge
case); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978)
(McDonnell formula applied to ADEA refusal to hire case).
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas involved a black employee who protested his lay
off from the company by conducting a "lock in" of company employees. When the company began
rehiring, it advertised for applicants to fill the black employee's former position. The black employee
applied, but the company refused to rehire him. Id. at 802.
16. An alternative method of proof is direct evidence. Direct evidence of discrimination would
be, for example, an employer's direct statement that he refused to hire or discharge an employee
because of his race, sex, religion or age, or other proof of employer intent to discriminate. The
courts disagree regarding what constitutes direct evidence in different situations. Edwards, Direct
Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof An Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1986).
17. This element ensures that the employee is within the zone of interests protected by the
statute. McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1980). Such a charac-
terization is necessary for standing. See infra note 18. In McDonnell Douglas the protected class
was a racial minority. 411 U.S. at 802.
18. 411 U.S. at 802. This element anticipates the employer's possible rebuttal to employment
discrimination-that the plaintiff was not qualified. Id.
19. Id. Cognizable injury to the plaintiff together with the first element represents "standing"
to sue. Id.
20. Id. at 802. This element demonstrates discrimination using relatively objective evidence.
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plaintiff's rejection.21 Finally, a court must allow the employee a chance
to prevail by showing the employer's reason was "pretextual."22
The McDonnell Douglas Court devised the indirect proof method to
compensate for evidentiary difficulties specific to employment discrimi-
nation cases.2 3 The McDonnell Douglas formula requires no direct evi-
dence of illegal motivation on the part of the employer.24 In fact, the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case allows some plaintiffs to prevail
without showing any evidence that the protected status was the deter-
mining factor in the employer's decision. 5 On the other hand, by requir-
ing the plaintiff to show the absence of the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for an employee's rejection, 6 the McDonnell
Douglas formula also spares the employer unnecessary litigation expense
21. Id. The employer's burden is one of production, not persuasion. The employer need only
produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by such reason. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
Courts have shown more leniency toward the employer's burden in ADEA cases, as opposed to
Title VII cases. Subjective reasons for the employer's actions such as the worker's failure to "mea-
sure up," or laying off the employees that the employer "would miss the least" provide legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for ADEA cases but would be unacceptable in Title VII cases. Player,
supra note 13 at 656.
22. 411 U.S. at 804. In McDonnell Douglas, where the employer refused to rehire a black
employee following illegal activities during his layoff, the Supreme Court stated that a party could
demonstrate pretext by showing: 1) rehiring of whites engaged in similar activities; or 2) statistical
showing of employer's general treatment of minority employees. Id. at 805 (1973).
The plaintiff at all times retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact of intentional
discrimination. Plaintiff must show his age, race, sex, religion, or national origin was a "determin-
ing" factor in the employer's actions. See generally Player, supra note 13.
23. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). These difficulties include
lack of written or oral evidence of the employer's motive and the employer's control over such
evidence.
Even an employer who knowingly discriminates on the basis of age may leave no written
records revealing the forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to no one. When
the evidence is in existence, it is likely to be under the control of the employer, and the
plaintiff may not succeed in turning it up.
La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984).
24. Player, supra note 14, at 627.
25. This happens when the plaintiff estabishes his prima facie case and the employer does not
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his action. The employer's failure to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason leaves only the plaintiff's established presumption of discrimination which
will result in a judgment, as a matter of law, for the plaintiff. Player, supra note 13, at 628. See
Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (under Title VII, if plaintiff
puts forth a convincing prima facie case and the employer is silent, plaintiff must win).
26. Legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons precluded by a convincing prima facie case include
lack of qualifications and absence of job openings. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st
Cir. 1979).
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if the employee cannot establish his prima facie case.27
The First Circuit adapted the McDonnell Douglas formula to an
ADEA discharge case in Loeb v. Textron, Inc..2 Because of the unavaila-
bility of direct evidence, and employers' control of such evidence, the
court found the formula well suited to discrimination cases. 29 The four
elements of the Loeb-modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie case are:
1) protected class membership; 2) job performance that met his em-
ployer's legitimate expectations; 3) discharge; and 4) employer search for
replacements with similar qualifications.30
The federal circuit courts disagree about the fourth element of the
prima facie case for an R.I.F. discharge. 31 Because the employer does
not seek a replacement, the fourth element set forth in Loeb is inapplica-
ble to an R.I.F. case. In Williams v. General Motors Corp.3 2 the Fifth
Circuit created a fourth element for R.I.F. cases requiring the employee
27. If the employee does not establish his prima facie case, the employer may file a motion to
dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or a motion for a directed verdict. Jayasinghe v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1985).
28. 600 F.2d 1003 (lst Cir. 1979). Textron, Inc. hired Loeb, age 50, for a management position
in 1971. Despite favorable reviews and raises, management terminated Loeb in 1975 for "poor job
performance," and replaced him several years later with a 46 year old. Loeb filed suit under the
ADEA. The District Court instructed the jury on the McDonnell Douglas burden of proof and the
jury found for Loeb. Id. at 1008. Textron appealed, claiming the McDonnell Douglas formula inap-
plicable to age discrimination cases. The First Circuit held the McDonnell Douglas formula applica-
ble. Id. at 1010.
29. "Proof of the McDonnell Douglas type prima facie case assures the plaintiff his day in court
despite the unavailability of direct evidence, and entitles him to an explanation from the defendant
employer for whatever action was taken." Id at 1014.
30. Id. The Loeb court adapted the McDonnell Douglas hiring decision elements to a discharge
decision. The first element, belonging to a protected class, remains the same. The second element,
qualification for the job, becomes adequate job performance (thus "qualified" for the job he held).
The third element, applicant's rejection, changes to employee's termination. The fourth element,
continued applicant search, changes to replacement search (both demonstrating a continued need for
the same services and skills). The Loeb court stated this adaptation produced an analogous inference
of discrimination. Ie at 1013.
31. The circuit courts generally agree the first three elements in Loeb prove suitable to R.I.F.
situations. However, standing alone, these elements do not create an inference of discrimination.
Scholl & Strang, supra note 13, at 346.
32. 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). In Williams, 15 plaintiffs
charged General Motors with age discrimination because it eliminated certain positions and rele-
gated supervisory positions to hourly wage positions. Following a jury verdict for some of the plain-
tiffs, General Motors appealed, stating the district court erred in failing to require the plaintiffs
demonstrate their replacments were outside the "protected age group." The Fifth Circuit held the
R.I.F. plaintiff need not show actual replacement. However, in absence of this evidence demonstrat-
ing the employer's discrimination, the plaintiff must produce circumstantial or direct evidence of the
employer's discriminatory intent. Id. at 129.
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to produce circumstantial or direct evidence that the employer intended
to discriminate because of age.33 Because the ADEA merely requires
employers to make employment decisions without regard to age, the
court reasoned the employee must show intent to discriminate.34
In Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.35 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit chose an alternative approach in R.I.F. situations. As the
fourth element of his prima facie case, the court required the employee to
show he was "disadvantaged in favor of a younger person."' 36 The court
refused to require direct evidence of discriminatory intent because the
exigencies of R.I.F. situations can be analyzed best when the employer
articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.37
33. Id. The court calls this the third element because it combines elements one and three from
Loeb into its first element. The requirement
simply insists that a plaintiff produce some evidence that an employer has not treated age
neutrally ... lead[ing] the factfinder reasonably to conclude either (1) that defendant con-
sciously refused to consider retaining or relocating a plaintiff because of his age, or (2) de-
fendant regarded age as a negative factor in such consideration.
Id. at 129-30.
Other courts have cited the Williams prima facie case without much elaboration. See, eg., EEOC
v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1187,
1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250, 256 (D. Conn. 1982); Deutsch v.
Carl Zeiss, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Seventh Circuit originally adopted the
Williams approach in Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1985).
One commentator insists the Williams approach in an R.I.F. situation puts an unreasonable bur-
den on the plaintiff. Direct evidence is rarely available and statistical data used as circumstantial
evidence is unreliable unless the employer has discharged a large number of workers. Player, supra
note 13, at 639. See also Thompson, Hauserman & Jordan, Age Discrimination in Reduction-in-
Force: The Metamorphosis of McDonnell Douglas Continues, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 46, 65-66 (1986)
(suggesting courts' sympathy toward an employer forced by economic problems to reduce its
workforce adds to the plaintiff's burden).
34. 656 F.2d at 129.
35. 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983). In Coburn the defendant ar-
gued the court should require direct evidence of discriminatory intent in R.I.F. situations. Other-
wise, anyone in the protected age group would presumptively have a cause of action because the
R.I.F. employees virtually always would be qualified for other company positions. The Coburn
court rejected the defendant's argument. Id. at 343.
36. Id. at 342. The Coburn court followed the reasoning in Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Other courts have followed the Cuddy/Coburn fourth element with some modifi-
cations. See, eg., Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d. Cir.) (requiring plain-
tiff to show "others not in the protected class were treated more favorably"), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
937 (1983); Parker v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n., 741 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1984) (tacitly confirm-
ing Coburn approach by not requiring discriminatory intent evidence and stating plaintiff would
have little difficulty establishing a prima facie case because he was qualified and was not given posi-
tions which younger employees filled).
37. 711 F.2d at 343.
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In Oxman v. WLS-TV3 8 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the functions of
the McDonnell Douglas indirect burden-shifting formula.39 The Court
found that the Coburn prima facie fourth element 4" conformed better to
the McDonnell functions than did the Williams prima facie element.41
The court enunciated three functions of the McDonnell Douglas
formula. First, the formula requires the employee to eliminate the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination.42 Second, the
formula allows the employer to avoid unnecessary litigation expense.43
Finally, the formula compensates for evidentiary difficulties by permit-
ting plaintiffs to succeed without introducing evidence that age was the
determining factor in the employer's decision.'
The Oxman court argued that the Williams analysis destroys the func-
tions of the McDonnell Douglas scheme because it starts with the em-
ployer's claim that he acted pursuant to an R.I.F.41 The court stated the
employee should not have the burden of disproving this claim in his
prima facie case.4 6 Requiring evidence of discriminatory intent at the
prima facie stage at best "fuses the prima facie and pretext steps." 47 At
worst, this requirement destroys the third function of the McDonnell
Douglas formula because the employee can no longer prevail without
producing some evidence of discriminatory intent.4"
38. 846 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 453-55. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
41. 846 F.2d at 455. For a discussion of the Williams elements, see supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text. The Oxman court's fourth element is "others not in the protected class were
treated more favorably." 846 F.2d at 455. The Oxman court explained this formulation "merely
requires an employer that releases a protected employee while simultaneously hiring (or not 'bump-
ing') younger employees to fill positions for which the older employee was qualified to explain its
actions without forcing the protected employee to uncover that elusive 'smoking gun.'" Id. at 455-
56. Although the court alludes to the requirement that the plaintiff be qualified to assume other
company positions, nothing in the court's prima facie case requires the plaintiff to prove this. The
Oxman prima facie case merely requires the plaintiff prove performance according to his employer's
legitimate expectations. Id. at 455.
42. Id. at 453. See supra note 26.
43. 846 F.2d at 453. See supra note 27.
44. 846 F.2d at 453. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
45. 846 F.2d at 454.
46. Id. The burden should be on the employer to introduce R.I.F. in its rebuttal as the motiva-
tion for discharge.
47. Id. See Player, supra note 13, at 666-67 (suggesting the plaintiff present both prima facie
and pretext evidence at the first stage of the trial to survive a directed verdict for the defendant in
courts which follow the Williams formula).
48. 846 F.2d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 1988). The third function of the McDonnell Douglas formula
compensates for the evidentiary difficulties by permitting the plaintiff to succeed without introducing
1989]
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The Oxman court noted that requiring direct or circumstantial evi-
dence of discriminatory intent is unnecessary to protect the employer
from unfounded claims.49 The R.I.F. inference of discrimination, estab-
lished when the employer retains "nonprotected" employees to perform
the plaintiff's job or another job for which the plaintiff was qualified, is
no weaker than the Loeb "replacement" inference of discrimination, 50
established when an employer discharges the plaintiff and obtains a
"nonprotected" replacement.51
The Oxman court thoroughly examined the McDonnell Douglas
formula's functions.52 Also, the court properly concluded that requiring
the employee to present circumstantial or direct evidence of the em-
ployer's discriminatory intent at the prima facie stage obstructs the
formula's purpose.53 Arguably, a plaintiff might satisfy the Williams cir-
cumstantial evidence requirement by proving the employer treated mem-
bers of the "nonprotected" class more favorably, blurring the difference
in the Williams and Oxman prima facie case criteria."4 Nonetheless, the
Oxman court's prima facie case eliminates confusion regarding what evi-
dence will satisfy Williams fourth element" and provides a clear method
for establishing a prima facie case in an R.I.F. situation.
any evidence that age was the determining factor in the employer's decision. The requirement to
produce direct or circumstantial evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent as in Williams
directly contravenes this function. See supra note 16.
49. 846 F.2d at 455.
50. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
51. 846 F.2d at 455. Because the discrimination inference is the same in either case, courts that
use the Loeb elements for discharge cases should not require more (i.e., circumstantial or direct
evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent) of plaintiffs in R.I.F. cases.
52. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 45-48 accompanying text.
54. In Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986), aff'd, 853 F.2d 768
(10th Cir. 1988), the employer moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to
establish a Williams prima facie case, having produced no evidence the employer did not treat age
neutrally in its decision. The plaintiffs argued such a showing destroyed the functions of the McDon.
nell Douglas formula and therefore the court should apply the Oxman prima facie case. The district
court found little difference between the two tests, stating, "Oxman simply supplies an example of
the type of proof required under Williams." Id. at 1330 (discussing Oxman II, 609 F. Supp. 1364
(N.D. II. 1985), in which the court held plaintiff proved his prima facie case). The court granted
motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs were unable to show employers offered available
jobs to younger employees. 627 F. Supp. at 1332. See Scholl & Strang, supra note 13, at 355 (best
evidence establishing the fourth element of Williams prima facie case is the placement or retention of
a younger person in a remaining job for which the plaintiff was qualified).
55. Scholl & Strang, supra note 13, at 355 (higher courts' failure to precisely delimit the fourth
element requires judges to decide what type of evidence rises to the level of creating a reasonable
presumption).
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The Oxman court's reasoning is flawed, however, in its assertion that
the prima facie case protects employers from unnecessary litigation ex-
pense.5 6 The court found the discrimination inference no weaker in an
R.I.F. situation involving retained younger employees than in a replace-
ment situation.5 7 However, usually in an R.I.F. situation the employee's
job no longer exists.5 8 Additionally, the Oxman prima facie case does
not require the employee to show he was qualified for another job within
the company. Oxman merely requires evidence that the employee was
performing according to his employer's legitimate expectations. 9 Thus,
the Oxman prima facie case fails to consider the situation in which an
employer eliminates an employee's job due to an R.I.F. and the employee
is not qualified to assume another position in the company.' Such an
employee could establish a prima facie case which would force the law-
suit to continue to the employer's rebuttal stage.61
The Oxman decision makes it easier for an employee dismissed in an
R.I.F. situtation to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. As a re-
sult, employers engaged in R.I.F. situations may be subject to more law-
suits and greater litigation expenses.
CG. V
56. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
57. 846 F.2d at 454.
58. Thompson, Hauserman & Jordan, supra note 33, at 64.
59. See supra note 41.
60. As one commentary noted,
Where the function has been eliminated, requiring an employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the employee who performed that function, but
could perform no other, would be to tacitly shift the burden of demonstrating the em-
ployee's (lack of) qualification to the employer. The protected worker who is qualified for
but one function in his employer's organization has no age discrimination claim when the
job itself - the duty, as opposed to just the person performing it - is eliminated.
Scholl & Strang, supra note 13, at 353.
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
1989]
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